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Abstract 
In social decision making, punishing non-cooperation and rewarding cooperation may not 
only affect cooperation because of instrumental reasons. They may also evoke moral 
concerns regarding cooperation as they signal that cooperation is socially approved of 
and non-cooperation socially disapproved of. I argue that punishments do this to a greater 
extent than rewards as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards 
communicate a voluntary rule. Indeed, the first experiment shows that, in a social 
dilemma, the concept of punishment increased cooperation and the concept of a reward 
did not. The second experiment showed that participants showed more disapproval 
towards an offender when there was a punishment for non-compliance than when there 
was a reward for compliance. These findings suggest that punishing non-cooperation 
more strongly foster moral concerns regarding cooperation than rewarding cooperation. 
Possible implications for internalizations are discussed.  
 
Key words: punishments, rewards, moral concerns, moral judgments  
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The Difference between Punishments and Rewards in Fostering Moral Concerns in Social 
Decision Making 
In modern society authorities regulate various kinds of behavior by using 
sanctions and rewards. For example, national governments punish speeding on the 
motorway, and managers try to induce employees to perform well by putting bonuses and 
promotions in prospect. These external incentives may steer behavior as people will 
probably want to obtain rewards and avoid punishments. But do these external incentives 
also affect the underlying motive to behave in the desired way? Does, for example, a fine 
on speeding also increase the feeling that it is morally wrong to speed? Does a bonus on 
hard working also increase the feeling that it is “a good thing” to make an effort for your 
company? As an authority who installs an external incentive you may hope that people 
not merely try to escape a punishment or try to obtain a reward, but also are aware that 
the undesired behavior is “morally wrong” and the desired behavior is “morally right”. 
After all, when you have convinced them of this, people will, for example, keep to the 
speed limit even if you are not monitoring them.  
In other words, for changing individuals’ behavior, individuals should be made 
aware of the moral norms attached to this behavior. In this paper it is tested how external 
incentives affect people’s moral concerns with regard to the behavior. More specifically, 
I will test how punishments and rewards differ in this.  
The expressive function of punishments 
In criminology, one of the most recognized functions of the law in general, and 
punishment in particular, is general deterrence (Bankston & Cramer, 1974; Bentham, 
1970; Williams & Hawkins, 1986). This concept implies that punishments deter 
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individuals from performing a certain behavior mainly because it makes the behavior less 
attractive for an individual. However, it is also recognized that the law and punishment 
systems do more that only making breaking the law less attractive (Cooter, 1998; 
McAdams, 2000; Williams & Hawkins, 1986). It is argued that punishment systems have 
an expressive function as they signal what the underlying attitudes in society are and 
show what is disapproved of in society. In other words, punishment systems provide 
normative validation of existing norms and they show moral condemnation towards the 
ones who trespass these norms. Because people are motivated to receive social approval 
and to avoid social disapproval, a punishment system may in this way indirectly steer 
people’s behavior (McAdams, 2000). In more psychological terms, this means that 
punishments may encourage injunctive norms, which are norms that describe how people 
should behave (and are normally contrasted against descriptive norms which are merely 
norms that describe how people normally behave). Injunctive norms have been shown to 
be strong behavioral motivators, even in such a way that they generalize over related 
behavior in other situations (Cialdini et al., 2006; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). As 
punishments seem to have this norm-expresing effect, it is not surprising that in law 
literature it is posed that they may also influence people’s personal moral judgments 
(Cooter, 1998): By expressing what the social norms are, people adhere more strongly to 
these social norms personally as well and are more likely to judge trespassing these 
norms as morally wrong.  
Also in psychology it is noted that punishments, besides a utilitarian function of 
deterring people performing a certain behavior, have a second important function, namely 
retribution. It is found that retribution or “giving just deserts” even forms a more 
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important motive for people to punish than deterrence (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 
2002; McFatter, 1982). The reason behind this is that trespassing a norm challenges the 
social norms and moral values within a community and that punishment is a way to 
reassert these norms and values (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). 
Punishments thus have a moral connotation in the sense that they are a symbolic means 
by which people feel that the norms of morality in a society are upheld. Indeed, research 
has shown that people’s desire to punish a norm violator is often driven by moral outrage 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003).  
Thus, the above reasoning suggests that punishment systems are highly associated 
with moral behavioral norms and that the concept of punishment is strongly connected to 
our moral sentiments. This may have consequences for the effect that punishment can 
have on awareness of moral norms. If indeed punishment is associated with moral 
sentiments, then it may also be the case that the mere installation of a punishment evokes 
moral concerns (see also Yanagida & Fujii, 2004). Thus, punishing littering or illegal 
downloading may cause people to realize that these behaviors are immoral and may thus 
evoke moral disapproval of littering or illegal downloading. Research by Thøgersen
(2003) supports this notion. In his study, installing a garbage fee increased people’s 
personal norms against too much garbage production which in turn induced them to 
decrease their garbage production. 
Punishments compared to rewards 
Besides punishing undesired behavior, one may try to counter undesired behavior 
by rewarding the desired behavior instead. When discouraging people to drive in 
environmentally unfriendly cars or to buy light bulbs that waste energy, one may also 
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reward people who buy environmentally friendly cars or low-energy light bulbs. The 
question is whether these rewards equally effect moral concerns compared to 
punishments.  
In this paper it is reasoned that they do not. My reasoning for this is that a 
punishment communicates a different kind of rule than rewards: Whereas punishments 
communicate obligatory rules, rewards communicate voluntary rules. The distinction 
between obligatory rules and voluntary rules (see also O'Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 
2005) parallels the distinction made by Kant (1797/1991) between perfect duties and 
imperfect duties. Perfect duties are duties you always have to perform to be moral (for 
example, being honest or loyal), and imperfect duties are duties you sometimes have to 
perform to be moral (for example, being charitable or kind). In consequence, people who 
violate a perfect duty are by definition judged as immoral whereas people who violate an 
imperfect duty not necessarily. So, an individual can still be moral when (s)he does not 
give money to a beggar, but not when (s)he tells a lie (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & 
Ketelaar, 2005; Trafimow, Reeder, & Bilsing, 2001; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). 
Consequently, violating a perfect duty (i.e. an obligatory rule) is regarded as more 
“morally wrong” than violating an imperfect duty (i.e. a voluntary rule).  
The difference between obligatory behavior and voluntary behavior, may be 
regarded as a continuum rather than as a dichotomous distinction (see also Trafimow et 
al., 2005). Consequently, in many moral behaviors, there is some latitude in whether 
individuals interpret a prescribed behavior as either obligatory or as voluntary. For 
example, whether being cooperative in social dilemmas is regarded as a moral obligation 
or as voluntary moral behavior may depend on the specific person (such as social value 
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orientation, c.f. Beggan, Messick, & Allison, 1988; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 
1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991) or on the context of the specific social dilemma (cf. Pillutla 
& Chen, 1999).  
The presence of either a punishment system or a reward system to promote a 
certain behavior is likely to be a factor that influences whether people interpret the 
behavior as obligatory or as voluntary. Because a punishment system punishes people 
who do not perform the desired behavior, it would communicate that the behavior is 
obligatory. Because a reward system rewards people who perform the desired behavior, it 
communicates that the behavior is voluntary. Consequently, by introducing a punishment 
for undesired behavior, an authority (or whoever introduces the punishment) shows more 
disapproval of undesired behavior than by introducing a reward for desired behavior and, 
therefore, communicates to a greater extent that the desired behavior is “morally right” 
and that the undesired behavior is “morally wrong”. Punishments may thus communicate 
a moral norm and evoke moral concerns to a greater extent than rewards. Consequently, 
under the presence of a punishment, the behavior will be judged more strongly in moral 
terms than under presence of a reward. This was tested in two studies. In the first study it 
was tested in the context of cooperation in a social dilemma. In the second study I 
focused on the extent to which people show moral disapproval towards someone who 
does not comply by a rule that is either backed up by a punishment or a reward. 
Study 1 
Method 
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Design and participants 
In this experiment, 114 first-year undergraduate psychology students from Tilburg 
University participated (95 female, 19 male, Mage = 19 years, SDage = 2.55). The 
experiment took about 15 minutes and participants received course credits for their 
participation. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (control, 
punishment, reward).  
Procedure 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in separate computer 
cubicles containing a table, a chair and a computer. Communication with other 
participants was prohibited. The instructions for the experiment appeared on the 
computer screen. Participants were told that they were linked to three other research 
participants in the lab. First they were given the general instruction that they would be 
presented with a decision situation in which they, similar to the three other group 
members, were to decide how many “coins” they were going to put in “the pool”.  
Then, the punishment condition, participants were told the following (reward 
condition is between parentheses):  
In decision situations such as these, it often happens that group members choose 
to punish (reward) those who put only few (put many) coins in the pool. Thus, 
group members often make other group members who put a few (put many) coins 
in the pool, pay a fine (obtain a reward). Those who put only few (put many) coins 
in the pool are thus punished (rewarded). 
It was stressed that, in the situation they were about to face, there would actually be no 
punishment (or a reward, in the reward condition) because the experimenters wanted to 
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keep the situation simple. This was specifically done to merely activate the concept of a 
punishment or a reward without at the same time creating an economical reason to 
cooperate (i.e. avoiding a punishment or trying to obtain a reward). In this way, 
cooperation levels would reflect internally rather than external motivated behavior. 
Nothing was told about a reward or punishment in the control condition. 
 After this, the situation they faced was explained more thoroughly. Participants 
were told that they owned 10 coins and so did the other three group members. Each coin 
was worth 1 Euro (about 1.60 USD). Each group member was given the opportunity to 
put coins in the pool. Coins that were contributed to the pool would be multiplied by 1.5 
and then equally divided among the group members, irrespective of how many coins each 
group member put in the pool. In this way, the decision situation participants faced was a 
social dilemma situation as 1) mutual cooperation (putting coins in the pool) yielded 
more than mutual defection (keeping coins to the self), but 2) keeping the coins for the 
self yielded more at an individual level than putting coins in the pool (Dawes, 1980). 
Participants were further told that one of the groups taking part in the experiment would 
be randomly selected to be actually paid the money they earned in this experiment. To 
make sure participants understood the situation, they were asked some quiz questions. 
After each quiz question the correct answer was provided.  
Then, moral concerns regarding cooperation were measured with twelve items on 
a scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Example items were “It is 
my moral duty to put coins in the pool”, “Group members who put many coins in the 
pool are ‘better people’ than group members who put few coins in the pool”, and “I find 
it is ‘not done’ to put few coins in the pool”. The scale had a high reliability (α = .88). 
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After this, participants were asked how many coins they gave to the pool. Then, to 
measure their social motives for their decision they were presented four statements 
(again, on a scale ranging from 1 to 7). These items were: “I wanted to make as much 
money as possible for myself” (reverse coded), “I wanted to make as much money 
possible for us together”, “I wanted everyone to earn the same amount of money”, and “I 
wanted to earn more than others” (reverse coded). The four items together formed the 
sufficiently reliable scale “motive of collective-interest” (α = .60). Then, the experiment 
was finished and participants were debriefed. As promised, two weeks later one of the 
groups was randomly selected and its group members paid according to their decisions in 
the experiment.  
Results 
Cooperation 
 It was hypothesized that the concept of a punishment made participants more 
cooperative than the concept of a reward. To test this, a one-way ANOVA was performed 
on the number of coins participants had put into to the pool. It showed that the conditions 
differed significantly, F(2,111) = 4.32, p < .05. Participants put more coins in the pool in 
the punishment condition (M = 6.76, SD = 2.48) than in the reward condition (M = 4.97, 
SD = 2.88) or in the control condition (M = 5.55, SD = 2.63), LSD Post-hoc analysis, p < 
.05. No difference was found between the reward condition and the control condition..  
Moral concerns with regard to cooperation 
 To test whether moral concerns would be stronger in the punishment condition 
than in the control and the reward condition, a one-way ANOVA was performed. The 
results showed a significant effect of the three conditions on moral concerns, F(2,111) = 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Punishments and rewards 11 
3.12, p <. 05. Moral concerns were stronger in the punishment condition (M = 3.86, SD = 
1.05) than in both the reward condition (M = 3.34, SD = 0.91) and the control condition 
(M = 3.36, SD = 1.07), LSD Post-hoc analysis, p < .05. No difference was found between 
the reward condition and the control condition. 
Motive of collective-interest  
 To test whether the punishment had increased the motive of collective interest, a 
one-way ANOVA was performed. This showed a significant effect of the conditions on 
the motive of collective interest, F(2,111) = 5.60, p < .005. The motive of collective 
interest was stronger in the punishment condition (M = 5.09, SD = 0.90) than in the 
reward condition (M = 4.48, SD = 1.06) and in the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 
1.10). LSD Post-hoc analysis, p < .05. No difference was found between the reward 
condition and the control condition. 
Mediation analyses 
 Mediation analyses were performed to test whether moral concerns and motive of 
collective interest respectively mediated the influence of punishment (versus reward) on 
cooperation. The dummy-coded variable “punishment” was made with value 1 for the 
punishment condition and value 0 for the control and the reward conditions. The dummy-
coded variable “control” was made with the value 1 for the control condition and 0 for 
the punishment and reward conditions. 
First, to contrast punishment against reward, cooperation was regressed on 
punishment and control. Only punishment predicted cooperation (B = 1.78, p < .005). 
Then, moral concerns were regressed on punishment and control. Again, only punishment 
was a significant predictor (B = .52, p < .05). Finally, when cooperation was regressed on 
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punishment, control and moral concerns, the effect of punishment on cooperation 
decreased (B = 1.22, p < .05) and moral concerns predicted cooperation (B = 1.08, p < 
.001). Thus, moral concerns partially mediated the effect of punishment on cooperation, 
Sobel’s z = 2.00, p < .05.1 
 The same procedure was performed with motive of collective interest as the 
possible mediator. Punishment significantly predicted motive of collective interest, B = 
0.62, p < .05. When regressing cooperation on punishment, control and collective 
interest, motive of collective interest predicted cooperation (B = 1.41, p < .001) and the 
effect of punishment on cooperation disappeared (B = 0.92, p = .09). Thus, motive of 
collective interest fully mediated the effect of punishment on cooperation, Sobel’s z = 
6.45, p < .001. 
 So, both moral concerns and motives of collective interest mediated the effect of 
punishment (versus reward) on cooperation. One could argue that these mediators are 
correlated and that one of them may be the real mediator that overrules the mediating 
effect of the other. Indeed, the two measures were positively correlated (r = .38). 
However, when both motive of collective interest and moral concerns are included in the 
regression of cooperation on punishment and control, they are both significant predictors 
(motive of collective interest, B = 1.19, p < .001; moral concerns, B = .68, p < .005).  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 confirm the expectations that, when people are confronted 
with a punishment system, they are more cooperative than when people were confronted 
with a reward system. It is unlikely that the higher cooperation rates in the punishment 
condition can be attributed to the fact that people merely wanted to avoid being 
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sanctioned. After all, instead of a punishment or reward system being actually present, it 
was merely suggested that either a punishment or reward system in the situation at hand 
was a common phenomenon. Moreover, the influence of the punishment system on 
cooperation appeared to be due to the fact that people’s moral norm regarding 
cooperation and people’s motive of collective interest was strengthened.  This all 
supports the idea that punishments communicate moral norms of cooperation and 
encourage moral concerns to a greater extent than rewards, which in turn makes people 
show more cooperation. The fact that it was the punishment condition and not the reward 
condition that always differed from the control condition, suggests that punishments 
made things better rather than that rewards made things worse. This issue will be 
addressed in the general discussion section of this paper.  
Study 2  
 In the first study, the main focus was on how punishment and rewards affected 
moral concerns regarding the desired behavior and people’s actual behavior. Next, I was 
interested in the difference between punishment and rewards on people’s behavioral 
reactions to others who show undesirable behavior. Research on strong reciprocity shows 
that people have the tendency to cooperate with others and punish a person who does not 
cooperate, even if this goes against their direct self-interest (Fehr, Fischbacher, & 
Gächter, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). Moreover, it also shows that, even 
when they are an “outsider”, people punish others who are non-cooperative in an 
interaction with someone else, and are even willing to pay for that.  
When punishments result in stronger moral concerns than rewards do, it can be 
expected that punishments, more than rewards, may also result in stronger social 
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disapproval towards others who show the undesired behavior. Consequently, punishments 
would lead to more negative behavioral reactions to others who show undesired behavior 
than to others who show desired behavior. This is what was tested in Study 2. The desired 
behavior in Study 2 was allocating money in a dictator-type game. It was hypothesized 
that, in case of a punishment more than in case of a reward, people would be more likely 
to choose an economically less attractive option over an economically more attractive 
option in order to put an allocator who shows undesired behavior at a disadvantage and to 
put an allocator who shows desired behavior at an advantage.  
In Study 2 the actual presence of a punishment or a reward was varied. In 
studying a punishment or reward with a specific size, however, it should be taken into 
account that people’s subjective experience of the size of the punishment may differ from 
their subjective experience of the size of the reward. After all, it is commonly found that 
there is an asymmetry in the subjective experience of losses and gains in the sense that 
losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Because punishments 
involve losses and rewards involve gains, participants will probably experience a fine as 
more severe than a reward of similar size. Because it has also been shown that the 
severity of a sanction can increase norms of morality (Mulder, Verboon, & De Cremer, 
2007), this subjective difference between the size of a punishment and the size of a 
reward may provide an alternative explanation for why punishments evoke stronger 
moral norms than rewards. To solve this, individuals’ subjective experience of the size of 
the punishment or reward was measured and controlled for.  
Method 
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In Study 2 participants were told that they took part in an experiment where they 
were required to evaluate a situation that was happening at that specific time in another 
experimental session somewhere else in the laboratory.  
Design and participants  
In this experiment 51 students (18 male, 33 female, Mage = 21.1 years, SDage = 
2.45) of Leiden University participated. The experiment took 20 minutes. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the punishment or reward condition. 
Procedure  
Participants were seated in experimental cubicles containing a table, a chair and a 
computer. Communication with other participants was prohibited. The instructions for the 
experiment appeared on the computer screen.  
Participants were led to believe that, in the laboratory, two experiments were 
running simultaneously: experiment X and Y. They were told that they themselves were 
taking part in experiment Y and that experiment Y implied judging a situation that took 
place in experiment X. The situation in experiment X was similar to a dictator game (see 
also Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). In reality, all participants actually participated in 
experiment Y.  
Participants were explained what decision participants faced in experiment X. 
More specific, participants were told that in experiment X participants formed couples in 
which one was assigned the role of “allocator” and the other the role of “recipient”. For 
the allocator and recipient together, 10 chips were available and the allocator could 
decide how to allocate them. The situation was represented by a picture in such a way 
that it was clear that neither of the two parties “owned” the chips (yet) and thus that the 
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way in which the allocator would allocate the chips could not represent the actions 
“giving away” or “stealing”. Allocators knew that, for them, each of the 10 chips was 
worth 2 EUR (Euros) and that the value of the chips to the recipient would be unknown to 
the allocators: For the recipient, chips could be worth either less than 2 EUR, more than 2 
EUR or equal to 2 EUR. This was done as ambiguity permits multiple interpretations of 
what is fair (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and in this way participants were given 
more liberty to judge what would be the most “fair” distribution of chips. By keeping the 
value of chips for the recipient unknown for the allocator, there was reason for the 
allocator (and the participants) to believe that another division than a 5/5 division could 
be seen as more fair than a 5/5 division.  
Sanction manipulation  
Participants were told that, in experiment X, for each specific allocator/recipient 
couple, the experimenter would make a request to the allocator how to allocate the chips. 
In the punishment condition, participants were told that experimenter installed a fine with 
a certain size (that varied between the allocator/recipient couples) that would be imposed 
on the allocator if (s)he did not follow the experimenter’s request. In the reward 
condition, participants were told that experimenter would give a bonus with a certain size 
(that varied between the allocator/recipient couples) to the allocator if (s)he did follow the 
experimenter’s request. In both conditions it was told that, because the experimenters 
were only able to check the decisions of some allocators, it was not certain whether 
allocators who did not follow the request (or: did follow the request in the reward 
condition) would actually be sanctioned (or rewarded in the reward condition): Whether 
an allocator, was actually fined or rewarded would depend on whether the experimenter 
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personally monitored the allocation decision of this specific allocator. Further, 
participants were told that, in experiment X, after the allocator made his or her decision, 
the computer would randomly determine whether the chips would be paid out in actual 
money.  
Then, participants were told that they would be informed about the decisions that 
two allocators in experiment X had made and of which the computer had determined that 
the chips would not be paid out in actual money. These allocators were referred to as 
“allocator A” and “allocator B”. Participants were told that these two allocators had not 
been monitored by the experimenter and thus could not be rewarded (or punished) in case 
that they had (not) followed the experimenter’s request. This was to assure participants 
that both allocators had not actually gained or lost money and that, so far, there was no 
difference between the allocators in financial outcomes.  
Participants were further told that for allocator/recipient couples A and B, the 
experimenter had requested the allocators to allocate 7 chips to the recipient and 3 chips 
to themselves. Additionally, the experimenter had communicated to the allocators that the 
fine they could receive if they allocated less than 7 chips to the recipient (or, in the 
reward condition, the bonus they could receive if they allocated at least 7 chips to the 
recipient), was 5 EUR (but recall that this fine or reward was not administered as these 
specific allocators had not been monitored). To assess whether participants had 
understood the information about allocator/recipient couples A and B, they were asked 
two control questions concerning the request of the experimenter and about fine or 
reward. Four participants answered these questions incorrectly and were left out the 
analyses.  
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Then, participants saw on the computer screen that allocator A had followed the 
request and had allocated 7 chips to the recipient, whereas allocator B had not followed 
the request and had allocated 5 chips to the recipient.  
Dependent variables  
Moral judgment about the behavior of allocator B (i.e. the one who had not 
followed the request) was measured by presenting eleven items on an answering scale 
ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The items started with “The fact that 
allocator B gave less than seven chips to the recipient....” and then continued differently. 
Three example items are “....is not very social towards recipient B”, “...is morally 
incorrect” and “...I do not judge negatively” (reverse coded). These items formed a highly 
reliable scale (Cronbach’s  = .95). 
Then, the behavioral measure of putting allocator B at a disadvantage and 
allocator A at an advantage was measured. This was done by asking participants to 
choose between two options: The first option was that they could equally split 9 EUR 
with allocator A (i.e. the allocator who had followed the request) so that both the 
participant and allocator A would receive 4.5 EUR. If they chose for this option, allocator 
B would receive nothing. The second option was that they could equally split 10 EUR 
with allocator B so that both the participant and allocator B would receive 5 EUR. If they 
chose for this option, allocator A would receive nothing. Participants were asked which 
of these two options they chose (cf., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). From an 
economic point of view, the second option was the best as it would yield more money (5 
EUR) for participants than the first option (4.5 EUR). From a moral point of view, 
however, participants may have wanted to choose the first option to withhold money 
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from allocator B (the one who had not followed the request) and to give allocator A (the 
one who had followed the request) money instead. By using this procedure, it was 
expected that people would be less likely to choose the more rational second option when 
they regarded contravening the request of the experimenter as “morally wrong” (and 
socially disapproved of) and complying with the request of the experimenter as “morally 
right” (and socially approved of). This is expected in punishment condition.  
Then, participants were asked their opinion about the size of the punishment or 
reward with the statement (text in reward condition is between parentheses) “I think the 
size of the fine (bonus) that was placed on contravening (complying with) the 
experimenters’ request was....” and was then followed by a seven point answering scale 
(1 = too small, 7 = too large).  
Finally, participants were fully debriefed about the experiment, thanked and were 
all paid the equal amount of 3 EUR (Euros). All participants agreed to this procedure. 
Results 
Judgment of size or punishment or reward 
 A t-test was performed to test whether participants judged the size of punishment 
and reward differently. It indeed showed that participants in the punishment condition 
judged the punishment as larger (M = 4.79, SD = 1.38) than participants in the reward 
condition judged the reward (M = 3.78, SD = 1.04). So, as expected, the subjective 
experience of the size of the punishment differed from the subjective size of the reward. 
The following analyses that are reported are an ANCOVA and a logistic regression with 
judgment of punishment/reward size as a covariate.  
Moral judgment  
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The hypothesis was that participants would judge the behavior of B (i.e. the 
allocator who had not followed the request) as “wrong” in moral terms to a greater extent 
when there was a punishment than when there was a reward. Indeed, participants in the 
punishment condition had a stronger moral judgment about B’s behavior (M = 3.59, SD = 
0.28) than participants in the reward condition (M = 2.73, SD = 0.28), F(1,44) = 4.34, p < 
.05.  
Social disapproval  
In addition, it was expected that in the punishment condition participants were 
more likely to choose the first option (the less economically attractive option of splitting 
money with allocator A rather than B) than in the reward condition. Indeed, in the 
punishment condition 54% of the participants chose the first option of not splitting money 
with allocator B but with allocator A, whereas in the reward condition, only 21% did, B = 
1.52, p < .05.  
Mediation analysis 
It was tested whether the effect of punishment versus reward on the behavioral 
measures of social disapproval was mediated by moral judgment. Punishment versus 
reward significantly predicted social disapproval (B = 1.52, p < .05) and significantly 
predicted moral judgment (B = -0.86, p < .05). When social disapproval was regressed on 
both punishment versus reward and moral judgment, moral judgment predicted social 
disapproval (B = -1.23, p < .001) and the effect of punishment versus reward disappeared 
(B = .99, p = .24). This indicated that moral judgment indeed mediated the effect of 
punishment versus reward on social disapproval (Sobel’s z = 1.78, p < .05). 
Discussion 
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The results of Study 2 show that the presence of a punishment system, more than 
the presence of a reward system, causes people to morally disapprove of someone who 
shows the undesired (either punished or not rewarded) behavior. Consequently, more 
strongly in presence of a punishment than in presence of a reward, people showed 
negative behavior towards someone who has shown undesired behavior and positive 
behavior towards someone who has shown desired behavior, even though this went 
against their self interest. Again this supports the notion that punishments result in 
stronger moral concerns than rewards.  
General Discussion 
 The two studies presented in this paper both support the idea that punishments 
communicate to a greater extent that the undesired behavior is morally wrong (and that 
the desired behavior morally right) than rewards. The results show that, compared to a 
reward, a punishment evokes stronger moral concerns and moral judgments, and makes 
people judge others who show the undesired behavior more negatively. The behavioral 
implications of this were shown in both studies. In Study 2, people were willing to pay 
for putting rule violators at a disadvantage compared to rule compliers (so punish rule 
violators and reward rule compliers). In Study 1, people themselves showed the desired 
behavior more when they were told that punishing undesired behavior was a common 
phenomenon than when they were told that rewarding desired behavior was a common 
phenomenon. This was not only due to stronger moral concerns, but also to a more 
stronger motive to serve the collective interest rather than the self-interest. So, these 
findings suggest that punishing non-cooperative behavior (compared to rewarding 
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cooperative behavior) encourages a norm to be cooperative that is perceived as a moral 
norm as well.  
A question that may be raised is whether punishments, compared to rewards, are 
better in increasing moral concerns or whether they are better in preventing moral 
concerns to decrease. Although results of Study 1 suggest that punishments increase 
moral concerns and rewards fail to do so, I do not wish to jump to conclusions on this 
subject. The main focus in this paper was on whether punishments affected moral 
concerns differently than rewards. I will not argue that rewards can never make things 
worse. In fact, research has shown that rewards may undermine moral concerns (Frey, 
1999; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Heyman & Ariely, 2004) or intrinsic motivation 
(Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Neither do I wish to argue that punishments always 
make things better as research has shown that punishments can sometimes undermine a 
moral frame as well (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). But 
what I do argue is that punishments will result in stronger moral concerns than rewards. 
This may often be the case because punishments increase them more strongly than 
rewards do. But in some instances punishments may be more successful in preserving 
moral concerns than rewards. So, the best conclusion to be drawn is that punishments are 
better than rewards in fostering moral concerns.  
Disapproval 
Previous work by Greitemeyer and colleagues (Greitemeyer & Kazemi, 2008; 
Greitemeyer & Weiner, 2003, 2006) suggest that rewards lead to more disapproval of 
morally incorrect behaviors than punishments do. The question may be raised how this 
relates to the data in the present paper.  
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Greitemeyer et al.’s  research concerned judgments of others that are perceived to 
have behaved to avoid a punishment or to obtain a reward. Their work shows that 
judgments about others is influenced by the possibility to attribute their behavior to a 
punishment or a reward. As avoiding a punishment is seen as a stronger external 
motivation than striving for a reward, more dispositional attributions about other people’s 
(im)moral behavior are made when they receive a reward for this behavior than when 
they avoid a punishment. In contrast, the present paper does not concern behavioral 
attributions to the punishment or reward, but shows that punishments differently affect 
moral concerns about the behavior per se. This finding has implications for both people’s 
own behavior and disapproval of others.  
Still, if one does consider how possible behavioral attributions may affect 
disapproval, two predictions can be made from Greitemeyer et al.’s work. First, it is 
predicted that people who perform moral behavior and get rewarded are judged as more 
moral than when they perform moral behavior and do not get punished. Second, it is 
predicted that, when people perform immoral behavior despite they are punished, they 
will be judged as more immoral than when they perform immoral behavior despite they 
miss out a reward. Although the former prediction is not in line with the idea that 
punishments result in stronger moral judgments than rewards, the second one is. So, the 
findings in this paper do not specifically support or contradict Greitemeyer et al.’s work. 
This is not so surprising considering the different theoretical point made in the present 
paper, namely that punishments and rewards differently affect moral concerns about the 
behavior per se and, as a result, disapproval of others who show the (un)desired behavior. 
The data in this paper support this theoretical point.   
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Punishment, rewards and internalization 
 The results of the two studies have implications for the differential effect of 
punishments and rewards on moral motives that underlie behavior. Punishment seems to 
be more successful in fostering a morality based motivation for behavior than rewards. 
The finding that punishment leads to more cooperation in Study 1 even without a 
punishment really present, suggests that punishments may be a better way than rewards to 
internalize a norm. A punishment may not only result in people feeling that certain 
behavior is morally good or bad, but it may also cause people to stick with the “good” 
behavior even when they do not actually expect a punishment when showing the bad 
behavior. This is also in line with research from child psychology by Kochanska and 
colleagues (Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001; Kochanska, Tjebkes, & Forman, 1998). 
These authors studied the difference between the “don’t” context (in which children are 
told to refrain from doing something they like) and the “do” context (in which children 
are told to do something they do not like). Children developed more committed 
compliance (i.e. compliance when the mother is not there to monitor them) in the “don’t” 
context than in the “do” context. Kochanska and colleagues concluded that telling 
children what they should not do will be internalized to a greater extent than telling 
children what they should do. Their conclusion fits the reasoning that obligatory rules 
communicate to a greater extent than voluntary rules that not complying by the rule is 
morally incorrect. As punishments are measures that communicate what one should not 
do and rewards are measures that communicate what one should do, punishments may 
consequently lead to internalization to a greater extent than rewards.  
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On the other hand, there is also literature that suggest that punishments, compared 
to rewards, are not a good measure to induce new behavior and internalization. Literature 
on behavior modification has suggested that, when punishing old behavior, there will still 
be positive associations with the old behavior, which makes it hard to extinguish. 
Rewarding new behavior, by contrast, will create new positive associations which can 
overrule those of the old behavior (Kazdin, 2001; Van der Pligt, Koomen, & Van 
Harreveld, 2007). In line with this, Skinner (1971, p. 28-29) argued that punishment may 
merely learn individuals to avoid the punishment, which may imply showing different 
undesired behaviors rather than showing the desired behavior (see also, Mulder, Van 
Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006). Also, from the area of cognitive dissonance and self-
perception theory (Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1957) one may expect people to attribute their 
behavior to external reasons rather than on internal reasons when an external incentive is 
present. Similarly, self-determination theory suggest that punishments and rewards harm 
feelings of autonomy and thus hinder internalization (e.g., Gagné, 2003; e.g., Joussemet, 
Koestner, Lekes, & Houlfort, 2004). Although there is, as far as I know, no research 
showing that punishment externalize more than rewards do, one may argue that 
punishment are more controlling than rewards and restrict freedom to a greater extent 
(see also Skinner, 1971, p. 28-29). Because of this, they may hinder internalization to a 
greater extent than rewards.  
As stated earlier, I do not want to question whether punishment can undermine 
intrinsic motivation. But I do suggest that, as far as moral behaviors are concerned, this 
effect may be less strong or even absent for punishment than for rewards. Whereas for the 
mere purpose of behavioral modification in a non-moral domain rewards may be more 
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suitable than punishments, in a moral domain, however, something more is going on than 
merely learning new behavior and unlearning old behavior. In a moral domain people are 
made conscious of what the social norm is. In such a domain, people do not merely act on 
what behavior yields the most advantages, but especially act on what they think they 
should do morally and what other people expect them to do. This paper shows that 
punishments more strongly than rewards communicate the message “behavior X is 
morally wrong and behavior Y is morally right”. As people are motivated to perceive 
themselves as moral beings (Bandura, 1999; Tsang, 2002) and have the inclination to 
have a self-serving and egocentric bias when making attributions for their own positive 
behavior (Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross & Sicoly, 1979) a punishment will not only 
motivate them to show behavior X, but will also encourage them to attribute their 
behavior to their moral intentions rather than to the presence of a punishment. So, the 
extra feature of a punishment that it evokes moral concerns may not only steer people’s 
behavior in the moral direction, but also form a buffer against attributing the 
externalizing the motivation to choose behavior Y rather than X and thus reduce the 
danger of undermining intrinsic motivation.   
From the above, it follows that a possible boundary condition for a punishment to 
foster moral concerns and possible internalization of the desired behavior is that this 
behavior should take place in a moral domain. Additionally, for a punishment to work in 
the moral domain, it should be clear what behavior is disapproved of and why. Often, 
sanctions may do this automatically. For example, the most obvious reason why 
surcharges on the purchase of energy slurping cars are installed is because these cars are 
an environmental hazard and thus, it is for welfare of the collective better not to use such 
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cars. In other situations the function of the sanction may be less clear. For example, when 
there is a fine for returning library books late, it may not be clear that returning library 
books late is discouraged to counter the harmful consequences to others who want to rent 
the overdue books and the resulting risk for the library of loosing customers. It may 
merely be interpreted as additional “administration costs” (see for how fines may induce 
a business frame of thinking, Fehr & Falk, 2001; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). So, 
punishments may be more likely to trigger moral concerns if the immoral aspects of the 
punished behavior are already salient to some extent. In situations in which these aspects 
are not salient, it may be best to provide explicit reasoning of why the punished behavior 
is wrong. Indeed, research on parents’ use of corporal punishment shows that even when 
this kind of punishment is “backed-up” by reasoning it is highly effective in preventing 
future misbehavior (Larzelere, 1986; Larzelere & Merenda, 1994).  
Another boundary condition of punishment to work better than a reward may be 
the extent to which it is experienced as just. A recognized disadvantage of punishments is 
that they, because of their coercive nature, evoke more negativity than rewards and may 
be regarded as unjust (Depoorter & Vanneste, 2005). For example, corporal punishment 
may be a particular kind of punishment that is perceived as unjust and harms the 
attachment bond between parents and children. Indeed, high levels of corporal 
punishment are related to aggression and lower levels of moral internalization (Gershoff, 
2002). However, corporal punishment is not shown to be ineffective when it is used 
mildly and non-predominantly (Larzelere & Kuhn, 2005). Also, research in social 
decision making by Van Prooijen, Gallucci and Toeset (in press) shows that only when 
(financial) punishment is unfair, it can decrease compliance. So, it may be especially in 
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cases in which punishment is regarded as just, for example when the authority who 
introduces them is perceived as trustworthy and legitimate, and when the punishment is 
not too harsh, that punishments evoke a moral norm more strongly that rewards do.  
Practical implications 
In many real life situations, authorities may only be interested in changing 
people’s behavior. For this particular purpose, rewards may be better than punishments. 
However, often it is desired that people not only change their behavior but also that they 
become aware that the new behavior is “morally correct” and the old behavior “morally 
incorrect”. Punishments seem to be better able to reach this goal than rewards. Of course, 
an ideal way to change behavior in a moral domain would be to combine rewarding the 
desired behavior and punishing the undesired behavior. However, when this is too 
complicated or expensive, one may well be advised to install a punishment rather than a 
reward because it more strongly communicates as moral message. So, if authorities, for 
example, are concerned with fostering a moral norm among citizens that one should stop 
buying energy slurping cars and buy energy-conserving cars instead, they should punish 
buying energy-slurping cars rather than rewarding buying environmentally friendly cars. 
This will not only foster moral concerns, but will also make it more likely that citizens 
will call each other to account when buying energy-conserving cars. Possibly, a more 
general norm may then be encouraged in favor of considering the environment in 
everyday choices, affecting other environment-related behaviors.  
Concluding remarks 
The present paper shows that punishment foster moral concerns to a greater extent 
than rewards, either because of increasing moral concerns (as Study 1 suggests) or 
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preventing a decrease in moral concerns. The extent to which punishment (compared to 
rewards) encourage internalization is still a topic of discussion. Two proposed boundary 
conditions are that the behavior should be in a moral domain and that the punishment 
should be regarded as just. The exact effect of punishments compared to rewards on 
internalization is an interesting topic for future research and should best be studied 
longitudinally. From the present findings can be concluded, however, that as punishments 
foster people’s moral concerns more than rewards, they are more likely to affect behavior 
in a positive way even if people expect not to get punished (or rewarded) for real (for 
example, when behavior is not perfectly monitored, or when the punishment or reward 
system is removed). As punishment, more than rewards, evokes social disapproval of 
showing the undesired behavior, it may not only be a better method to foster moral 
concerns with regard to individual behavior, but also a better method to uphold a norm 
within a social community. Of course, this is the best way to make people behave 
accordingly.  
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Footnotes 
1 Because the p-values that Sobel tests report are regarded as too conservative 
(McKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; McKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 
2002) I used, for all Sobel tests reported in this paper, the corrected p-values as provided 
by McKinnon et al. (McKinnon et al., 2002). 
 
